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Abstract
The objective of this research is to verify the level of relationship between the mechanisms 
of corporate governance and the performance of the companies of the public subsector, 
listed on BM&FBovespa. The research was based on the financial statements from 2010 to 
2014, obtained on the BM&FBovespa website, resulting in a sample of 63 companies with 
315 observations. In order to calculate the performance proxy of the company, the ROA was 
used, and for the calculation of the proxies of the corporate governance mechanisms were used 
for the quality of the audit, the concentration of ownership in common shares and preferred 
shares, participation in the levels of governance of BM&FBovespa, number of shares held by 
the government and number of directors in the Board, adapted from the Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) survey. Convergence with national and international research, the findings of the 
study showed that such variables as quality of profit, concentration of ownership in preferred 
shares, participation in governance levels and size of the Board are positively related to the 
performance of the company; already a concentration of ownership in common shares and 
number of shares held by the government are negatively related to performance. For future 
reference, it is recommended to expand other sectors of the market as well as to use other 
mechanisms of corporate governance, presented in the literature.
Keywords: Corporate Governance. Performance. Public Subsector.
Resumo
O objetivo da pesquisa foi o de verificar o nível de relação entre os mecanismos de governança 
corporativa e o desempenho das empresas do subsetor de utilidade pública, listadas na 
BM&FBovespa. A pesquisa teve como base os dados das demonstrações financeiras de 2010 
a 2014, obtidas no sítio eletrônico da BM&FBovespa, resultando assim, em uma amostra de 
63 empresas, com 315 observações. Para o cálculo da proxy de desempenho da empresa foi 
utilizado o ROA, e para o cálculo das proxies dos mecanismos de governança corporativa 
foram utilizadas a qualidade da auditoria, concentração de propriedade em ações ordinárias 
e em ações preferenciais, participação nos níveis de governança da BM&FBovespa, número 
de ações mantidas pelo governo e número de diretores no Conselho, adaptado da pesquisa de 
Mollah e Zaman (2015). Convergente com pesquisas nacionais e internacionais, os achados 
desse estudo evidenciaram que as variáveis qualidade do lucro, concentração de propriedade 
em ações preferenciais, participação nos níveis de governança e tamanho do Conselho são 
positivamente relacionados com o desempenho da empresa; já a concentração de propriedade 
em ações ordinárias e o número de ações mantidas pelo governo são negativamente relacionadas 
com o desempenho. Para pesquisas futuras, recomenda-se ampliar a outros setores do mercado 
bem como utilizar outros mecanismos de governança corporativa, presentes na literatura.
Palavras-chave: Governança Corporativa. Desempenho. Utilidade Pública.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The previous literature has highlighted a wide range of mechanisms related 
to corporate governance, especially in research at an international level (CHANEY; 
FACCIO; PARSLEY, 2011; CHEN, 2016; CHOI; LEE; PARK, 2013; EL‐SAYED 
EBAID, 2013; GUL; SRINIDHI; NG, 2011; HAZARIKA; KARPOFF; NAHATA, 
2012; ISIK; INCE, 2016; JIZI et al., 2014; MACEDO; CORRAR, 2012; MOLLAH; 
ZAMAN, 2015; RODRIGUEZ-FERNANDEZ; FERNANDEZ-ALONSO; RO-
DRIGUEZ-RODRIGUEZ, 2014; SÁENZ GONZÁLEZ; GARCÍA-MECA, 2014; 
ZIAEE, 2014). Among these, we highlight quality of audit, board composition, num-
ber of board members, duality of roles, government participation in the voting capi-
tal and cash flows, equity participation of managers and board members, ownership 
structures (right to vote, right to cash flows, difference between voting capital and 
cash flows), participation of financial institutions in the voting capital and compensa-
tion in the form of employee stock options (ATHANASAKOU; OLSSON, 2012; EL‐
SAYED EBAID, 2013; HAZARIKA; KARPOFF; NAHATA, 2012; JIZI et al., 2014; 
RAJGOPAL; VENKATACHALAM, 2011; SÁENZ GONZÁLEZ; GARCÍA-MECA, 
2014; SHIRI et al., 2012).
The effectiveness of corporate governance in overseeing the financial repor-
ting process is essential for the preservation of investors and the confidence in capital 
markets. It is expected that better corporate governance mechanisms lead to a better 
understanding of the reliability of the company’s performance by investors measured 
by profit (EL-SAYED EBAID, 2013). Corporate governance, at the beginning of this 
century, after the collapse of large companies such as Enron (world’s largest energy 
company) and WorldCom (world’s largest telecommunications company), has taken 
a new dimension in the business scenario, where it is expected that the application 
of corporate governance principles promotes information with a greater persistence, 
and that this information reverberates in financial markets in order to encourage in-
vestment. Thus, under the proposed mechanisms for corporate governance, there is 
expectation that they be able to reduce agency costs, limit the opportunistic behavior 
of management, leading to an improved quality and reliability of information, and 
also increase the value of the company (SHIRI et al., 2012).
Corporate governance mechanisms have been linked to several accounting 
measurements such as company performance. The results are mixed. Some studies 
have shown evidence that governance mechanisms impact positively on the results of 
companies (KARAMANOU; VAFEAS, 2005; ZIAEE, 2014; SHIRAI, 2004; TIAN; 
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ESTRIN, 2008; BOUBRAKI et al., 2011; MIGUEL; PINDADO; TORRE, 2004). 
Moreover, Xu and Wang (1999), Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000), Sun and Tong (2003), 
and Bai et al. (2004) found a negative correlation between corporate governance and 
performance.
It is expected for the Public Utility sector – the one with the greatest repre-
sentation among the sectors listed in the BM&FBovespa regarding the number of 
companies, i.e., 73 – the use of good corporate governance mechanisms because the 
ownership of a public utility title confers prestige and credibility to the extent that it 
can be considered as a proof for an official recognition of services rendered by the 
entity. In addition, other direct benefits are the ability to receive grants from the Union 
and its state companies, the possibility, for income tax collection purposes, for the 
donor (entity) to deduct from its gross income the contributions made to public utility 
entities according to the Law no. 9.249/95, and tax immunity. 
Thus, the following stands out as a research problem: What is the level of re-
lation between performance and corporate governance of Brazilian public companies 
listed in the “public” sub-sector of BM&FBovespa? In order to answer this question, 
this research aims to analyze the level of relation between corporate governance and 
performance of public companies listed in the BM&FBovespa. To achieve this ge-
neral objective, this research has the following objectives: (a) demonstrate the link 
between performance and audit quality, (b) stress the relation between performance 
and government participation in the voting capital, (c) demonstrate the links between 
performance and participation in corporate governance standards of BM&FBovespa, 
(d) demonstrate the links between performance and ownership structure, and (e) de-
monstrate the links between performance and board size.
Until the research, no studies in the Brazilian context were found that inves-
tigated the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the performance 
of companies in the public utilities sector, especially quality of audit, government 
participation in the voting capital, participation in the corporate governance levels of 
BM&FBovespa, ownership structure and board size.
Studies related to corporate governance are timely, especially in view of an 
international relevance specifically in developed countries, e.g. USA and some Euro-
pean Union countries, where such relations have been stressed and notably drawing 
the attention of universities. Few studies have analyzed it in developing countries 
such as Brazil.
Another motivation for the study is the public utility sector itself, which is 
poorly researched in the accounting literature. However, it has a high prominence 
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especially due to a great number of companies among those listed, to regulation for 
they meet part of the basic needs of the population and to representation, with a high 
number of companies among the sectors listed in BM&FBovespa. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Information on the company’s characteristics, financial position and perfor-
mance are useful to users in the current assessment and in making future estimates 
particularly about future cash flows. However, managers may use such discretionary 
choices opportunistically because of a possible link between their salary and the re-
sults and also because of other factors, e.g. the company’s other contracts. They may 
use such criterion to enhance the informational value of accounting information (es-
pecially profit) to eventually disclose to investors the long-term performance of the 
company (CHANEY; FACCIO; PARSLEY, 2011). 
Accounting frauds discovered in the capital markets confirm the existence of 
ethical lapses and evidence the importance of transparency and reliability of financial 
information provided to the market (LANG; LUNDHOLM, 2000). The regulatory 
response to financial scandals has been taking steps to protect the transparency of 
information, mitigate conflicts of interest and ensure the independence of auditors, 
all in order to protect the interests of investors and increase the confidence of capital 
markets (LEUZ; NANDA; WYSOCKI, 2002). 
The use of good corporate governance mechanisms tend to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry between shareholders and managers, reducing the control rights 
which they, together with creditors, assign to managers, enabling the increase in the 
probability of investment projects by managers that maximize shareholders’ weal-
th (SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1997). Companies with a weak corporate governance are 
more likely to manage results in order to meet or surpass analysts’ forecasts (SHIRI 
et al., 2012). In the absence of any effects of corporate governance, it is expected the 
profit quality to be low (ATHANASAKOU; OLSSON, 2012).
Previous studies have highlighted the relation between corporate governance 
mechanisms and business performance (SILVEIRA, 2004; ISIK; INCE, 2016; MA-
CEDO; CORRAR, 2012; MOLLAH; ZAMAN, 2015; RODRIGUEZ-FERNANDEZ, 
FERNANDEZ-ALONSO; RODRIGUEZ-RODRIGUEZ, 2014; ZIAEE, 2014). A 
great part of the literature investigates the relations between governance mechanisms 
and company performance, including shareholder value of non-financial companies 
(STANWICK; STANWICK, 2010; WEIR et al., 2002). The empirical evidence is 
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however mixed (BAUER et al., 2008; GANI; JERMIAS, 2006; LARCKER et al., 
2007; STANWICK; STANWICK, 2010). A number of studies reported positive ef-
fects of corporate governance on the value of non-financial companies (e.g., LEE et 
al., 1992). Hutchinson (2002), for example, reported a negative association between 
corporate governance and company value, while Gupta et al. (2009) did not think 
corporate governance affects the company’s value.
Such studies have shown the impacts of various corporate governance me-
chanisms on the performance and quality of profit, among which the following may 
be mentioned: number of board members, number of shares held by the government, 
percentage of participation of the majority ordinary shareholder, percentage of pre-
ferred shares of the majority ordinary shareholder, quality of audit (Big Four), and 
participation in the governance levels of Bovespa.
2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
This section proposes to develop research hypotheses about the impacts of 
several corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of companies listed in 
BM&FBovespa.
2.1.1 AudQua (Audit Quality)
An external audit conducted in accordance with high quality auditing stan-
dards can promote the implementation of accounting standards by entities and helps 
to ensure that its financial statements are reliable, transparent and useful to the market, 
thereby increasing confidence. In addition, quality audits can help to reinforce a strong 
corporate governance, risk management and internal controls in companies, thereby 
contributing to financial stability (ZIAEE, 2014).
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) found that the financial expertise of audit 
committees is associated with a greater likelihood of management gains, more in-
formative good news forecasts and more positive reactions from the stock market to 
management forecasts. Krishnan (2005) shows that audit committees with financial 
experience are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal 
control problems. In addition, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) found that auditors 
charge lower rates for companies when their audit committees have financial experts. 
In this context, the following hypothesis is confirmed:
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H1: There is a significant and positive relation between audit quality and per-
formance of public companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA, ceterius paribus.
2.1.2 GOVERNMENT SHAREHOLDING
Existing empirical studies have reported mixed results on this issue. For 
example, Xu and Wang (1999), Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000), Sun and Tong (2003), and 
Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, Zhang (2004) found a negative correlation between government 
shareholding and company performance. Chen and Gong (2000) found a positive cor-
relation. Shirai (2004) and Tian and Estrin (2008) argue that there may be a U-shaped 
relation between government shareholding and performance.
Li, Sun and Zou (2009) found that government shareholding has a significant 
negative relation with the performance of companies when they are sufficiently profi-
table. In other words, while the government still seems to exert a strong influence on 
the performance of partially privatized companies, the quantitative relation between 
government shareholding and company performance is nonlinear and asymmetric. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is confirmed:
H2: There is a significant negative relation between the number of shares held 
by the government and the performance of public companies listed in BM&FBOVES-
PA, ceterius paribus.
2.1.3 Ownership Structure – Proportions of common shares of the 
majority shareholder
Shareholders with a great participation in the voting capital play an important 
role in the internal control of companies because the volume of participation encoura-
ges them to monitor and influence the strategy of the company in which they invested 
capital (GABRIELSEN; GRAMLICH; PLENBORG 2002; YEO et al., 2002). This 
means that a higher concentration of property must be in accordance with the hypo-
thesis of efficient monitoring (JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976) and must lead to a less 
opportunistic behavior and a greater tendency to maximize the value of the company 
(FAMA; JENSEN, 1983; FAMA, 1980), thus affecting positively the informative-
ness of accounting profits since the increase in the participation of the controlling 
shareholder reduces this owner’s incentives to expropriate the wealth from minority 
shareholders (BOUBRAKI et al., 2011; MIGUEL; PINDADO; TORRE, 2004). In 
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this sense, De Bos and Donker (2004) stress that increased ownership concentration is 
a CG mechanism effective in monitoring accounting decisions made by management.
La Porta et al. (1998) point out that, in most developing economies, there is 
a high level of ownership concentration. A simple ownership concentration measure 
can be obtained by the percentage of shares held by shareholders of a group of com-
panies (LEFORT, 2005). Regarding the Brazilian reality, many authors distinguish 
the ownership structure based on voting rights and the participation in cash flows 
(SILVEIRA et al., 2007; SILVEIRA; BARROS, 2008). The higher the percentage of 
common shares held by the controller, the greater the possibility of expropriation from 
outside shareholders. This could lead to a worse level of corporate governance as a 
result of the concentration of control rights. On the other hand, a higher concentration 
of control rights could cause the company to adopt best corporate governance prac-
tices in order to offset the increased possibility of expropriation. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is confirmed:
H3: There is a significant negative relation between Ownership Structure – 
proportions of common shares of the majority shareholder - and performance of pu-
blic companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA, ceterius paribus.
2.1.4 Ownership Structure – Proportions of preferred shares of the 
majority shareholder
As for the percentage of total shares held by the controller, the higher the per-
centage, the lower the possibility of expropriation due to a greater participation of the 
controlling shareholder in cash flow rights. However, this could also lead to a worse 
level of corporate governance, as the controller participation itself in the total capital 
could be seen as a governance mechanism that would reduce the company’s need to 
adopt better corporate governance practices (SILVEIRA; BARROS, 2008). 
In general, regarding Brazilian companies, the higher the percentage of com-
mon shares owned by the controller, the higher the possibility of expropriation from 
minority shareholders and the worse the level of corporate governance, in thesis. On 
the other hand, the higher the participation of this same shareholder in cash flows, 
the lower the possibility of expropriation from minority shareholders. The higher the 
concentration of preferred shares by the controller, the lower the expropriation from 
outside shareholders (SILVEIRA, 2004). Thus, the following hypothesis is confirmed:
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H4: There is a significant positive relation between Ownership Structure - 
proportions of preferred shares of the majority shareholder - and performance of pu-
blic companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA, ceterius paribus.
2.1.5 Participation in the levels of corporate governance of 
BM&FBovespa
Companies that adhere to different levels of Bovespa’s Corporate Governan-
ce must comply with the strictest standards of governance and must provide, on ave-
rage, better control mechanisms for aligning the interests of managers, mainly when 
compared to other companies in their country of origin (SILVEIRA; BARROS, 2008; 
SILVEIRA; PEROBELLI; BARROS, 2008).
Companies that voluntarily adhere to special segments of Corporate Gover-
nance of BM&FBovespa, especially Level 2 and New Market, should commit to a 
greater transparency and CG standards. Therefore, such companies should present 
a better CG at the company level than the companies listed in the traditional listing 
segments (SILVEIRA et al., 2007). Overall, several studies state that good corporate 
governance practices improve company performance (ISIK; INCE, 2016; MACEDO; 
CORRAR, 2012). In this context, the following hypothesis is confirmed:
H5: There is a significant and positive relation between adhesion to corporate 
governance levels of BM&FBOVESPA and performance of public companies listed 
in BM&FBOVESPA, ceterius paribus.
2.1.6 Board Size
Studies such as Dâvila and Watkins (2009) and Correia et al. (2011) found 
that, if a board is too small, the monitoring of the management team is low. Therefore, 
directors tend to greater discretion in receiving a higher pay and a higher chance of 
earnings management. They are also more prone to information asymmetry (BRICK; 
PALMON; WALD, 2006; ANDRES; AZOFRA; LOPEZ, 2005). Thus, a larger size of 
the Board of Directors results in a better monitoring of the management team and in a 
higher quality of corporate decisions (PEARCE; ZAHRA, 1992). 
Most studies suggest a negative association between board size and com-
pany performance. Board size is negatively related to the value of the company due 
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to the fact that companies with larger boards of directors tend to use their assets in a less 
efficiently way and profit less (YERMACK, 1996). For example, Jensen (1993) suggests 
that a limited number of board members is important for an effective corporate governance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) reported that board size is negatively associated with com-
pany performance and quality of decision-making. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) found that 
board size has a negative impact on the company’s value in Singapore and Malaysia. Guest 
(2009) concludes that board size has a strong negative effect on company profitability when 
measured by Tobin’s Q and stock returns. 
O’Connell and Cramer (2010) show a negative association between board size and per-
formance when measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q for companies listed in the Irish stock market. 
Gill and Mathur (2011) found a negative relation between board size and company profitability. 
Nguyen et al. (2014) concluded that board size has a significantly negative influence on company 
performance after endogeneity emission control. On the other hand, based on non-financial busi-
ness samples, Boone et al. (2008), Coles et al. (2008), Linck et al. (2008) and Lehn et al. (2009) 
concluded that some companies might benefit from larger boards of directors. A study conducted 
by Isik and Ince (2016) found a positive relation between the board size and financial performance 
of financial institutions. Thus, the following hypothesis is confirmed:
H6: There is a significant and positive relation between number of directors in the board 
of directors and performance of public companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA, ceterius paribus.
3 METHODOLOGY
 
To achieve the purpose of this study, information from corporate financial 
statements was collected from the Economática® database and from the BM&FBO-
VESPA website obtained through the EmpresasNet external disclosure software. 
Initially, the sample consisted of 73 Public companies: 64 companies in the electricity 
sub-sector, two companies in the gas sub-sector and seven companies in the water and sanita-
tion sub-sector. Data were from 2010 to 2014, i.e., a period of 5 consecutive years. The final 
sample comprised 63 companies, which was justified by the exclusion of 10 companies that 
lacked the information necessary for research on financial statements, i.e., 315 companies/year.
To calculate the regression of the dependent variable (1), audit quality, concen-
tration of ownership of common shares, concentration of ownership of preferred shares, 
participation in the governance levels of Bovespa, number of shares held by the gover-
nment, and number of directors in the board were used and adapted from the work by 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) according to the data model shown in the following equation:
1171
Mechanisms of corporate governance and performance: analysis of public...
RACE, Joaçaba, v. 16, n. 3, p. 1161-1184, set./dez. 2017 |  E-ISSN: 2179-4936
         (1)            
Where:
ROA = Operating profit divided by average assets
AUDQUA = Audit quality, dummy variable with value “1” if Big Four or 
otherwise “0”.
OWNCON = Concentration of ownership, percentage of common shares of 
the majority shareholder.
OWNPROP = Concentration of ownership, percentage of preferred shares of 
the majority shareholder. 
BOV = Participation in the levels of corporate governance of BM&FBovespa
GOVT = Number of shares held by the government divided by the total num-
ber of common shares.
BSIZE = Number of board directors.
The variables, expected signs and justifications are summarized in Board 1. 
Board 1 – Justification of variables
Variables
Expected relation 
between variables 
and the ROA
Justification
AuditQuality
(AUDQUA)
Positive
The quality of the audit is critical to the company’s 
financial performance; positive relation (ZIAEE et 
al., 2014).
Structure of common 
Shares Ownership
(OWNCON)
Negative
In theory, the higher the concentration of common 
shares, the higher the possibility of expropriation 
from outside shareholders (SILVEIRA, 2004).
Structure of 
Preferred Shares 
Ownership
(OWNPROP)
Positive
The higher the concentration of preferred shares 
by the controller, the lower the expropriation from 
outside shareholders (SILVEIRA, 2004).
Governance Level
(BOV)
Positive
Several studies state that good corporate governan-
ce practices improve company performance (MA-
CEDO; CORRAR, 2012; OZCAN; INCE, 2016).
Government Sha-
reholding (GOVT)
Negative
Xu and Wang (1999), Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000), 
Sun and Tong (2003), and Bai et al. (2004) found 
negative correlations between government sha-
reholding and company performance.
Board Size
(BSIZE)
Positive
Positive relations between board size and financial 
performance of financial institutions (ISIK: INCE, 
2016).
Source: the authors.
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3.1 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
The choice of the variable Return on Assets [ROA] – operating profit divided by 
average assets – at the expense of other variables such as proxy for performance. It is noted 
that this variable aims to assess the manager’s efficiency in using assets to generate profits. 
Thus, the results cannot be extrapolated to other company performance metrics.
Likewise, the independent variables measure the impacts of audit, ownership 
structure, participation in different levels of BM&FBovespa, government participation 
in the voting capital and board size on the performance of companies. The results are 
limited to these corporate governance indicators and cannot be extrapolated to others.
Another limitation is that the study’s findings refer to companies in the Public 
Utility sector driven by a strong regulation. Therefore, they cannot be generalized for 
other companies belonging to other sectors listed in BM&FBovespa.
4 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
In order to verify the relations between quality of profits and corporate go-
vernance, company performance was used as Proxy for profit quality, represented by 
the variable ROA (company net income divided by average assets), as established by 
Mollah and Zaman (2015).
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the other variables, in which the re-
sults show that (a) an average of 58% of the surveyed companies are audited by inde-
pendent auditor companies, considered as Big Four, which indicates that more than 
half of the analyzed companies have a high-quality audit; (b) on average, boards are 
composed of 10 directors, 85% of which are non-executives of the company; and (c) 
approximately 38% of the researched companies have adhered to at least one of the 
special segments of corporate governance of BM&FBovespa.
1173
Mechanisms of corporate governance and performance: analysis of public...
RACE, Joaçaba, v. 16, n. 3, p. 1161-1184, set./dez. 2017 |  E-ISSN: 2179-4936
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
ROA 0.063235 0.101710 3.082896 -4.34720 0.405937
AUDQUA 0.582010  1.000000  1.000000  0.000000 0.493882
OWNCON 0.726050 0.7366  1.000000 0.157 0.251875
OWNPROP 0.231906  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 0.363276
BOV 0.317460  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 0.466105
GOVT 0.329834 0.038  1.000000  0.000000 0.384378
BSIZE 10.92063 9 30 3 6.775603
Source: the authors.
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
research: the highest-value relation is between the variables OWNCON and BOV 
(-0.5341). However, it was not necessary to adjust the model variables. Additionally, 
a multicollinearity test was performed using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in order 
to verify whether a variable is a linear combination of two or more variables of the 
model. The result (not tabulated) evidenced values below 10, which proves that there 
is no multicollinearity among the variables.
Table 2 – Correlation matrix 
Variables AUDQUA BOV BSIZE GOVT OWNCON OWNPROP
AUDQUA  1
BOV  0.2207 1
BSIZE  0.2635  0.2347 1
GOVT  0.0572  0.1834  0.3504 1
OWNCON  -0.0085 -0.5341 -0.1115  -0.0416 1
OWNPROP  -0.0408 -0.3817 -0.2213 -0.2648  0.4293 1
Source: the authors.
In addition, the basic assumptions of OLS regression (normality, homos-
cedasticity and autocorrelation of residues) were also analyzed by Jarque-Bera test, 
White test, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and Durbin-Watson test. The tests indicated 
that the residues follow a normal distribution, that there is no autocorrelation among 
residues and that they are homoscedastic, which meets the assumptions of linear re-
gression.
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The model used to process the panel data was obtained using the pooled 
approach. The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 – Regression analysis of Corporate Governance and Performance variables
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T statistic p-value
CONST 0.056725 0.006687 8.482347 0.0000
AUDQUA 0.011336 0.003663 3.095017 0.0021
OWNCON -0.028935 0.010986 -2.633804 0.0089
OWNPROP 0.058165 0.009566 6.080263 0.0000
BOV 0.002645 0.002821 0.937680 0.3491
GOVT -0.152371 0.006537 -23.31038 0.0000
BSIZE 0.006497 0.000431 15.06559 0.0000
R² 0.130497
Adjusted R² 0.095007
F statistic 3.677026
P-value (Est. F) 0.000135
Source: the authors.
Dependent Variable: Company performance (ROA). Independent variables: Audit Quality (AUD-
QUA), Structure of Common Shares Ownership (OWNCON), Structure of Preferred Shares Ownership 
(OWNPROP), Governance level of BM&FBovespa (BOV), Government Shareholding (GOVT), and 
Board Size (BSIZE). 
Regression data evidenced that the variable AUDQUA showed a significant 
coefficient at 1% (p-value = 0.00) and a positive coefficient regarding the dependent 
variable (ROA), thus confirming the hypothesis that companies audited by an inde-
pendent audit company among the so-called Big Four, thus presenting a better quality 
of the performed audit, also performed better. Thus, the first research hypothesis was 
confirmed, indicating that there is a significant and positive relation between quality 
of audit and the performance of the companies surveyed. 
The second research hypothesis, which seeks to determine the existence of 
a significant negative relation between the number of shares held by the government 
and the performance of the companies surveyed, was confirmed: the variable GOVT 
was statistically significant (p-value = 0.00), especially with a negative coefficient. 
Thus, for the sample of companies surveyed, the higher the number of shares held by 
the government, the worse the performance of the company.
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The variable OWNCON showed a negative significant coefficient at 1% 
(p-value = 0.00), confirming the third research hypothesis, which indicates that there 
is a significant negative relation between the company’s ownership structure (pro-
portions of common shares of the majority shareholder) and its performance. That 
is, the higher the number of shares the controller shareholder holds, the worse the 
performance of the company.
On the other hand, the concentration of preferred shares was also studied. 
It showed a positive coefficient and a statistical significance (p-value = 0.00). This 
indicates that the higher the concentration of preferred shares by the controlling sha-
reholder, the greater the performance of the company. According to a study by Silveira 
(2004), which also showed the same tendency, this positive relation is due to the exis-
tence of a lower expropriation from outside shareholders.
The variable BOV showed no significance, with a p-value of 0.3491. Howe-
ver, when analyzing only the meaning of the coefficient, it can be noticed that it 
showed the initially expected signs, that is, companies that are listed in at least one 
governance segment of the BM&FBovespa also performed better. This was also ob-
served by other studies such as those conducted by Macedo and Corrar (2012) and 
Ozcan and Ince (2016), who also showed that good governance practices improve 
company performance.
Regarding the variable BSIZE, the same statistically significance (p-value 
= 0.00) and positive coefficient were observed. This corroborates the sixth research 
hypothesis, according to which there is a positive and significant relation between the 
size of the board of directors and company performance. Consistent with the works 
by Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Isik and Ince (2016), a larger Board of Directors has 
a better oversight of management and, consequently, a better quality of business deci-
sions, resulting in a higher company performance.
5 CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this research was to investigate the relations between perfor-
mance and corporate governance of companies in the sub-sector “public company” 
listed in the BM&FBOVESPA.
In order to verify performance and corporate governance, the variable ROA 
(net income divided by average assets) was used with the following independent va-
riables: (a) quality of audit (AUDQUA), (b) structure of common shares ownership 
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(OWNCON), (c) structure of preferred shares ownership (OWNPROP), (d) level of 
governance (BOV), (e) government shareholding (GOVT), and (f) board size (BSIZE).
Initial results showed that the analyzed companies have auditing quality, go-
vernment participation and institutional shareholdings. The variable quality of audit 
presented significant coefficients, indicating that companies that were audited inde-
pendently by the so-called Big Four showed a higher audit quality as well as a higher 
performance.
 This confirms the significant negative relation between the number of sha-
res held by the government and the performance of the companies surveyed. It was 
verified by the GOVT variable, which showed a negative coefficient. Therefore, it is 
noteworthy that the higher the number of shares held by the government, the lower 
the performance of the company. On the other hand, upon confirming the third hypo-
thesis, it is concluded that if there is a high number of shares held by the shareholder, 
there will be a negligible company performance.
Upon dealing with the concentration of preferred shares, it was observed that 
the coefficients had significant positive results, indicating that the higher the con-
centration of preferred shares by the controller, the better the performance of the 
company. In the analysis, it was found that the variable level of governance was not 
significant. However, when analyzing only the coefficient level, it is expected that 
companies listed in any governance segment of BM&FBovespa perform better. There 
was also a significant positive relation, confirming the sixth hypothesis, which posits 
a significance between board size and company performance.
In sum, the findings of the research are related to those found in international 
and national studies, as already highlighted for the determining of the hypotheses, 
ceteris paribus.
It is recommended that further research on performance versus corporate go-
vernance be conducted with other sectors and other corporate governance mechanis-
ms in addition to those of this research.
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